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The Paradox of Infinite Given Magnitude:
Why Kantian Epistemology Needs Metaphysical Space
by Lydia Patton, Blacksburg
Abstract: Kant’s account of space as an infinite given magnitude in the Critique of Pure Rea-
son is paradoxical, since infinite magnitudes go beyond the limits of possible experience.
Michael Friedman’s and Charles Parsons’s accounts make sense of geometrical construction,
but I argue that they do not resolve the paradox. I argue that metaphysical space is based on
the ability of the subject to generate distinctly oriented spatial magnitudes of invariant scalar
quantity through translation or rotation. The set of determinately oriented, constructed geo-
metrical spaces is a proper subset of metaphysical space, thus, metaphysical space is infinite.
Kant’s paradoxical doctrine of metaphysical space is necessary to reconcile his empiricism
with his transcendental idealism.
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In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant gives four characteristics of the concept
of space “als a priori gegeben”. These are meant to show that space and time “nur
an der Form der Anschauung allein haften, und mithin an der subjektiven Be-
schaffenheit unseres Gemüts”.1 Kant says that space is “als eine unendliche gege-
bene Größe vorgestellt.”2 These two characteristics contradict one another prima
facie, since we are not presented with infinite objects, quantities, magnitudes, or
series in ordinary experience. With this paradox, interpreters of Kant are faced
with a clash between Kant’s empiricism and his defense of the synthetic a priori.
In his Commentary on the Critique, Hans Vaihinger summarizes a debate
that had arisen over the paradox.3 Since space is given, it seems that space should
1 KrV, A 23/B 37.12–38.13.
2 KrV, A 25/B 39.21, emphasis Kant’s. The reason for the usual translation of “Größe” as
“magnitude” is to leave the English word “quantity” as a translation for “Quantität,”
and thus to distinguish the category of quantity from spatial or geometrical “magni-
tudes.” Daniel Sutherland has argued that “magnitudes” have a distinct role in the Criti-
cal philosophy (Daniel Sutherland: “The Role of Magnitude in Kant’s Critical Philos-
ophy.” In: Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34, 2004, 411–442). However, in this essay,
Sutherland emphasizes the role of magnitudes in the Anticipations of Perception and the
Axioms of Intuition, not in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Sutherland has also, following
Michael Friedman, emphasized the influence of the Greek theory of proportions between
magnitudes on Kant (Daniel Sutherland: “Kant on Arithmetic, Algebra, and the Theory of
Proportions.” In: Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.4, 2006, 533–558). In this
essay, Sutherland observes that the use of “magnitude” or Kant’s “Größe” can extend to
numeric quantity as well: “Euclid, on the other hand, thought of numbers as magnitudes,
since magnitudes are characterized as what can stand in ratios, and numbers can stand in
ratios” (Sutherland 2006, footnote 16). In what follows, I will consider the term “Größe”
to cover spatial magnitudes such as extension and figure.
3 Hans Vaihinger: Commentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft zum hundertjährigen
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be actually infinite. In 1790, the mathematician Abraham Kästner published com-
ments on Kant’s concept of space in Eberhard’s Philosophisches Magazin, arguing
that there can never be an actual infinity present in space, even in geometrical
construction, but only a finite, indeterminate magnitude that progresses toward
infinity.4 For instance, a geometrical line can be drawn ad infinitum but never con-
stitutes an actual, absolute infinite magnitude. In Kant’s responses to Kästner, he
makes a distinction between metaphysical and geometrical space:
Die Metaphysik muß zeigen, wie man die Vorstellung des Raumes haben, die Geometrie aber
lehrt, wie man einen beschreiben, d. i. in der Vorstellung a priori (nicht durch Zeichnung)
darstellen kön¯e. In jener wird der Raum, wie er, vor aller Bestim¯ung desselben, einem gewis-
sen Begriffe vom Objecte gemäß, gegeben ist, betrachtet; in dieser wird einer gemacht. In
jener ist er ursprünglich und nur ein (einiger) Raum, in dieser ist er abgeleitet und da giebt
es (viel) Räume, von denen aber der Geometer, einstim¯ig mit dem Metaphysiker, zu Folge der
Grundvorstellung des Raumes gestehen muß, daß sie nur als Theile des einigen ursprüng-
lichen Raumes gedacht werden können.5
In 1801, Gottlob Schulze argues on the basis of this and other passages that,
while Kant may mean that space is infinite and given, Kant is licensed only to argue
that space is comparatively infinite. The representation of an actual infinity cannot
be described as “given,” because it goes beyond the boundaries of a possible ex-
perience. Schulze claims that Kant’s commitments in the Antinomy doctrine mean
that he cannot allow for an absolute (or actual) infinity present in experience.6 In
other words, Schulze argues that Kant’s empiricist and anti-metaphysical commit-
ments are in conflict with his doctrine of the absolute infinity of space.
Vaihinger responds to Schulze that we can have access to a given, absolutely in-
finite space in experience. According to Vaihinger, Kant sees the original, a priori,
subjective space as a kind of ability, namely, the ability of the subject to continue
any space to infinity. The example of “drawing a line in thought” from the
Deduction (at B 137–138) supports this interpretation, for instance. Further sup-
port comes from another passage that Vaihinger cites from Kant’s discussion with
Kästner:
Wen¯ nun der Geometer sagt, daß eine Linie, so weit man sie auch fortgezogen hat, im¯er noch
weiter verlängert werden kön¯e: so bedeutet das nicht, was in der Arithmetik von der Zahl
gesagt wird, daß man sie durch Hinzusetzung anderer Einheiten oder Zahlen im¯er und ohne
Ende vergrößern kön¯e […], sondern eine Linie kan ins Unendliche fortgezogen werden heißt
so viel als: der Raum, in welchem ich die Linie beschreibe, ist größer als eine jede Linie, die
ich in ihm beschreiben mag; und so gründet der Geometer die Möglichkeit seiner Aufgabe,
einen Raum (deren es viel giebt) ins Unendliche zu vergrößeren, aus der ursprünglichen Vor-
stellung eines einigen unendlichen, subjectiv gegebenen Raumes.7
Jubiläum derselben, second volume. Stuttgart 1892, 253f. All translations from this work
are mine. Vaihinger founded the journal Kant-Studien and wrote the seminal work Die
Philosophie des Als-Ob (Berlin 1911).
4 Abraham Kästner: Ueber den mathematischen Begriff des Raums. In: Philosophisches
Magazin, ed. Johann Eberhard. 2.4, 1790, 403–419.
5 RezKästner (Über Kästners Abhandlungen), AA 20: 419.01–10.
6 Schulze cites the passages at KrV, A 428/B 456 and following.
7 RezKästner, AA 20: 419.18–420.13.
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Vaihinger argues that this passage supports the interpretation that space is
a representation of our subjective capacity or ability to represent space a priori
as extending beyond any possible geometrical construction (e.g., a continued line)
or represented body. The space that the subject represents to itself is infinite
and given to the subject. However, Vaihinger argues, when Kant continues, he
weakens his position by being ambiguous. Kant argues:
Daß aber der metaphysisch, d. i. ursprünglich, aber bloß subjectiv gegebene Raum, der (weil
es dessen nicht viel giebt) unter keinen Begrif gebracht werden kann, welcher einer Construc-
tion fähig wäre, aber doch den Grund der Construction aller möglichen geometrischen Be-
griffe enthält, unendlich sey, damit wird nur gesagt: daß er in der reinen Form der sinnlichen
Vorstellungsart des Subjects als Anschauung a priori besteht, folglich in dieser, als einzelnen
Vorstellung, die Möglichkeit aller Räume, die ins Unendliche geht, gegeben ist.8
Vaihinger observes that following Kant’s argument to this point leads to a
further puzzle. Is “subjectively given space” a sensible, introspective represen-
tation of “the pure form of representation of the subject a priori”, or is it a
thought concept: the “possibility of all spaces, that go to infinity”? As Vaihinger
puts it, there are two possible ways to interpret the passage:
(1) The intuition of space is actually given to us as infinite,
(2) This infinity is only a thought one.9
Vaihinger’s dilemma leads to the question of whether (original, metaphysical)
space is a concept that contains particular spaces under it, or whether it is a rep-
resentation that contains particular spaces within it. The notion that a priori spa-
tial relations are obtained through construction of concepts, or through geometri-
cal construction, is known as the epistemic interpretation of Kant, whereas the
view that spatial relations are given immediately in intuition or experience is
known as the phenomenalist reading. Recently, Michael Friedman has defended
the epistemic reading and Charles Parsons the phenomenalist reading of Kant on
the infinity of space. Following Kant’s own remarks in his response to Kästner,
both have analyzed Kant’s texts from the standpoint of trying to assess the necess-
ary and sufficient conditions for geometrical construction.
Friedman assesses the difference between his and Parsons’s interpretations in
terms of how they spell out Kantian intuition, and in particular, “the role of intu-
ition in Kant’s theory of geometry”.10 For Friedman, following Evert Beth and
Jaako Hintikka, Kantian geometrical Anschauung (intuition) is needed to “gener-
ate singular terms in the context of mathematical reasoning in inferences such as
we would represent today by existential instantiation.”11 Kant’s mathematical
logic and his algebra do not allow him to demonstrate the existence of certain sin-
gular terms easily represented in geometrical construction, such as the diagonal of
8 RezKästner, AA 20: 420.15–421.04.
9 Vaihinger (1892), 256.
10 Michael Friedman: Geometry, Construction, and Intuition in Kant and his Successors. In:
Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons, ed. Gila Sher, Charles
Parsons, and Richard L. Tieszen. Cambridge 2000, 186.
11 Friedman (2000), 186.
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a unit square, the square root of two, an example Kant discusses at length in the
Nachlaß (see below for a discussion). Whereas we are able now to give a proof of
the existence of such geometrical quantities independently of intuition, Kant was
not, and so, Friedman argues, Kant harnesses geometrical intuition to fill the gap.
On Friedman’s reading, geometrical intuition is necessary to represent certain
magnitudes or quantities. Parsons observes that, even with the help of geometry,
ordinary intuition does not appear to present us with a direct representation of
a given infinite space. Like Vaihinger, Parsons sees a conflict between Kant’s em-
piricist requirement that all synthetic reasoning be demonstrable in intuition and
his argument that geometrical space is infinite. Parsons focuses on the fact that
space is intended to be a form of intuition, and he points out that this gives rise to
a problem:
Kant also supposed that space has certain mathematical properties which are reflected as
properties and relations of the objects in space. It is of course the fact that they describe the
form of our intuition which makes mathematical propositions a priori. Kant, of course, sup-
posed that we know a priori that space is Euclidean. This means, in particular, that it is both
infinite in extent and infinitely divisible. It is this which is the source of the difficulties.12
Parsons sees these difficulties as arising from the fact that the “doctrine of con-
tinuous space as a form of outer intuition” prima facie conflicts with “the fact of
the limited acuteness of our senses”.13 Parsons points out that if space is infinite in
extent and in divisibility, and if we perceive it as such, then, on the most obvious
reading of Kant, our senses ought to be able to perceive series of infinite exten-
sion, and infinitely divisible objects, directly. If continuous space is the form of
outer sense, then objects of sense should be given to us as continuous. This would
mean, though, that when representing a line, we would be able to in some way
represent to ourselves each of the successive infinitely small parts of the line (for
Kant, the component spaces of the line) at the same time. In other words, each
of the infinitely small parts of the line would be explicitly given to us at the same
time. But this does not seem possible for us.
Parsons resolves these difficulties by distinguishing between explicit and impli-
cit givenness, based on the distinction in Gestalt psychology between “figure” and
“ground”. In our perceptions, we are presented initially with a physical object,
say, which is the “figure”. But within that explicitly given perception, there are
additional aspects of the object, not given explicitly with our initial represen-
tation. When we shift focus, we are able to represent these. These aspects may in-
clude subtle degrees of color, variations of shape, and spatial divisions. Parsons
concludes that Kant meant to say that “whatever appears to us as ground can be-
come figure,” which Parsons calls the “Continuability Principle”.14 When we rep-
resent a figure, it is at the same time given to us that we can focus on a distinct
part or aspect of that figure at will. This change of focus makes available a differ-
12 Charles Parsons: Infinity and Kant’s Conception of the ‘Possibility of Experience’. In:
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: Critical Essays, ed. Patricia Kitcher. Lanham 1998, 39.
13 Parsons (1998), 45.
14 Parsons (1998), 47.
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ent set of quantities, e.g., degree of color, and the change from one set of quan-
tities to another is continuous. For instance, we can shift focus from the outline or
borders of a figure to its color without intervening steps. In this sense, space as we
perceive it is an infinite quantity given in experience. A boundless spatial horizon
is necessary to the type of representations we have of objects of experience.
Friedman objects to Parsons’s claim that infinite space, or at least spatiality,
is given to us immediately in perception. Based on his logical or epistemic reading
as outlined above, Friedman points out that we could regard infinite space as a
necessary and sufficient a priori condition for geometrical construction, and, in
particular, for the concrete representation of certain types of geometrical particu-
lars. According to Friedman, it is in this sense, as a part of the process of geometri-
cal construction, that Kant considers space to be an infinite, given form of intu-
ition. For Friedman, that space is “given” does not mean that the infinite parts of
the objects of our representations are given to us at once, but rather that geometri-
cal construction can reveal to us continuous quantities not otherwise accessible.
Geometrical, and not ordinary, “intuition,” then, is the source of the givenness of
infinite space. This conclusion leads to a characteristic feature of Friedman’s ac-
count. Some set of spatial concepts is necessary a priori to construct, or constitute,
the objects of intuition and, in particular, the objects of geometry and of physics.
We know that the quantity “the square root of two” exists, because it is given in
geometrical construction as the length of the diagonal of a unit square, but that
quantity cannot be accessed in sensible intuition without an a priori spatial con-
cept under which to subsume it.
In remarks on the debate between Parsons and Friedman, Emily Carson argues
that Friedman cannot be right that the infinity of a priori space comes from geo-
metrical construction. For in his correspondence with Kästner, Kant makes a clear
distinction between metaphysical and geometrical space, and it is metaphysical
space that is meant to ground our geometrical constructions. Carson argues that
metaphysical space is given as unique and boundless independently of geometrical
construction:
Whereas Friedman takes the essential feature of space underlying the arguments of the Meta-
physical Exposition to be infinite divisibility as revealed by geometry, I want to suggest
rather that the essential feature is the uniqueness and boundlessness of space as a condition
for the possibility of experience, from which the infinity of geometrical space is supposed to
follow. This is a claim about the space of experience, how space is given to us independently
of and indeed prior to geometry, and it is this experience which serves as data for Kant’s syn-
thetic method.15
Carson argues that Friedman cannot be correct that the infinity of metaphysical
space is a result or byproduct of geometrical construction, because Kant says
quite clearly in his response to Kästner that metaphysical space is prior to geo-
metrical space and is a precondition for geometrical construction.
15 Emily Carson: Kant on Intuition in Geometry. In: Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27,
December 1997, 496.
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I agree with Carson that Friedman’s initial view is wrong here. However, I think
that several related questions remain about how to conceive of the relationship
between metaphysical and geometrical space. First, Carson argues that metaphys-
ical space is “unique” and “boundless” in Parsons’s sense, that is, that “the
uniqueness of space is indicated by the fact that particular spaces are given in one
all-encompassing space.”16 As seen above, Parsons cashes out this view in terms
of Gestalt psychology and the possibility of continuous changes of focus between
figure and ground. But if Kant really did hold a view like this, what was his ac-
count to mirror Parsons’s Gestalt explanation?
Second, Friedman has conceded to Carson that geometrical construction can-
not be the source of the infinity of metaphysical space.17 But Friedman remarks
that there remains a problem for the phenomenalist view. The infinite metaphys-
ical space that Kant wants to use to “justify or verify the possibility of Euclidean
constructions” cannot be “directly seen”. We do not have “direct perceptual
or quasi-perceptual access to such infinity entirely independently of geometry”.
In particular, Friedman objects to Parsons’s continuability principle that “since
the visual field is itself always finite, it does not even appear to be true that any
perceived spatial region is directly given or perceived as part of a larger such re-
gion.”18 Even if one accepts the phenomenalist account, it does not prove that an
actual infinite space is given in experience. Parsons’s principle is the “continuabil-
ity,” not the “actually continuous” principle. Parsons’s method is grounded on an
activity of the subject as well as on the facts revealed to us in spatial perception.
As Carson observes, on the phenomenalist account the uniqueness and boundless-
ness of metaphysical space rests on the fact that metaphysical space is a condition
for the possibility of experience.
On the basis of these considerations, Friedman also concludes that the infinity
of space is grounded on an activity of the subject, but he focuses instead on the a
priori “figurative synthesis” of the imagination. Thus, if successful, Friedman’s
account will answer the first question I raised above, of how to demonstrate that
Kant himself would have agreed with these interpretations. The figurative syn-
thesis of the imagination allows the subject to draw a straight line in thought and
then rotate such a line around a fixed point, as Kant puts it.19 The figurative syn-
thesis, for Friedman, is the source of our ability to construct geometrical proofs.
And it is the source of the unity and of the infinity of space:
the subject can imaginatively change the given point of location by a translation through
space and imaginatively change its given orientation by a rotation around this point. More-
over, by an appropriate combination of such translations and rotations the subject can
thereby imaginatively put itself in position to perceive any outer object located anywhere in
perceptual space. It is in this sense, I believe, that perceptual space is necessarily both singu-
lar or unitary and infinite or unbounded.20
16 Carson (1997), 499.
17 Friedman (2000), 188f.
18 All the above citations are from Friedman (2000), 189.
19 Friedman (2000), 189, cites the passage at RezKästner, AA 20: 410–411.
20 Friedman (2000), 192.
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The “pure formal structure of perceptual space” is the ability of the subject to
imaginatively change its perspective without limit. Friedman’s revised account re-
sembles Parsons’s in this respect, but a significant difference remains.
For Parsons, the possibility of changing focus or orientation in space is given
in experience. When a subject “continues” a spatial representation by changing
focus to an element of the representation that hitherto was in the background
or on the horizon, she does not introduce a new element. Instead, she synthesizes
material that has been given in the initial representation – what Kant refers to in the
A edition as the reproductive synthesis of the imagination (A 100–102). In contrast,
Friedman appeals to the productive, figurative synthesis of the imagination a priori
(A 162/B 203 and following). The figurative synthesis, the subject’s ability to orient
herself in space and time, is independent of given representations. Instead, the figu-
rative synthesis is constitutive of our intuitions, as Kant says explicitly (A 179/B 221
and following). However, the figurative synthesis is described in the Axioms of In-
tuition, that is, in the Transcendental Analytic, not in the Transcendental Aesthetic.
Can the figurative synthesis be a necessary condition of metaphysical space? Must
we presuppose the results of the Analytic to justify the results of the Aesthetic?
Indeed, Friedman’s account departs deliberately from Kant’s original presenta-
tion at just this point. Following Robert DiSalle, Friedman looks to Hermann von
Helmholtz to back up the procedure of figurative synthesis. Bernhard Riemann’s
“axiom of free mobility” has it that space has constant curvature only under the
assumption that spatial objects can be moved anywhere in space without deform-
ing – shrinking or tearing, for instance.21 Helmholtz specified the most general,
abstract geometrical axioms that must hold for us to be able to construct any geo-
metrical space. Helmholtz argued that the set of rotations and translations that
preserve a figure’s form make up a set of “rigid motions,” and that geometers
must assume some set of rigid motions to be able to construct any space of con-
stant curvature.22 Friedman’s solution makes rigid motions primary and any par-
ticular set of geometrical axioms secondary, which has a great deal to recommend
it. First, it makes sense of the distinction between metaphysical and geometrical
space. Second, it allows for Friedman’s own account, again following Helmholtz,
according to which the choice between particular sets of axioms is free (Euclidean
axioms are not necessary unless you wish to limit yourself to constructing a space
of zero curvature) and only free mobility is necessary.
But I do not think that Friedman’s account goes far enough yet to constitute
a complete interpretation of Kant’s theory of metaphysical space. Friedman has yet
again constructed a view according to which metaphysical space results from an a
priori synthesis. Whether this synthesis is the figurative synthesis of the imagination
21 Bernhard Riemann: Ueber die Hypothesen, welche der Geometrie zu Grunde liegen. In:
Bernhard Riemanns Gesammelte Mathematische Werke, ed. Richard Dedekind and Hein-
rich Weber, second revised edition. Leipzig 1892 [1854], 285, my translation.
22 Hermann von Helmholtz: Über die Thatsachen, welche der Geometrie zu Grunde liegen.
In: Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen, Volume II. Leipzig 1883, 618–639. Originally pub-
lished in the Nachrichten von der Königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen.
No. 9, 3 June 1868.
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or not, this move contradicts Kant’s remarks in the correspondence with Kästner
that metaphysical space cannot be brought under any constructible concept:
[E]ine Linie kan ins Unendliche fortgezogen werden heißt so viel als: der Raum, in welchem
ich die Linie beschreibe, ist größer als eine jede Linie, die ich in ihm beschreiben mag; und so
gründet der Geometer die Möglichkeit seiner Aufgabe, einen Raum (deren es viel giebt) ins
Unendliche zu vergrößeren, aus der ursprünglichen Vorstellung eines einigen unendlichen,
subjectiv gegeben Raumes […]. Daß aber der metaphysisch, d. i. ursprünglich, aber blos sub-
jectiv gegebene Raum, der (weil es dessen nicht viel giebt) unter keinen Begrif gebracht
werden kan, welcher einer Construction fähig wäre, aber doch den Grund der Construction
aller möglichen geometrischen Begriffe enthält, unendlich sey, damit wird nur gesagt: daß
er in der reinen Form der sinnlichen Vorstellungsart des Subjects als Anschauung a priori be-
steht, folglich in dieser, als einzelnen Vorstellung, die Möglichkeit aller Räume, die ins Un-
endliche geht, gegeben ist.23
There are many geometrical spaces, as Kant says here, but only one a priori,
subjectively given, original, metaphysical space. Metaphysical space cannot be
subsumed under a concept of quantity because there is, necessarily, only one
metaphysical space, the a priori representation of space.
According to Friedman, metaphysical space is based on the axiom of free mo-
bility plus the subject’s ability to place itself in distinct perspectives, to access any
object in any spatial position. Thus, for Friedman, the unity of metaphysical space
can be based only on the unity of the synthesis of paths through space from an
initial standpoint. But the basis of this unity is given to us through construction,
whether imaginative or not. Why should the subject’s ability to synthesize or to
“perceive” outer objects necessarily be single and original, in that case?
Thus, I do not see how metaphysical space is shown to be necessarily single, on
Friedman’s view. The only sense in which the group of rigid motions necessarily
must form a single “space” a priori is the sense in which the subject’s ability to
place itself in an infinite number of perspectives must stand under the conditions
for a possible unified experience.24 But, again, how is the proof that this space is
single to go? Is there a way to express the proof without appealing to geometrical
construction? Friedman himself realizes that this is a problem, and he appeals
to the claim that “all outer objects must be reachable via translation and rotation,
as it were, from a single initial given point of view.”25 But this is a statement about
the possible paths through space that a subject can take from an initial stand-
point, not a statement about why that initial standpoint itself is necessary, for
instance (see concluding remarks). I do not think that Friedman’s take is wrong,
but I do think we can say more about what Kant means here.
At this point, Parsons might argue that Friedman’s account reaches an impasse,
out of which Parsons’s own account can lead us. The epistemic or logical reading
23 RezKästner, AA 20: 420.07–421.04.
24 Helmholtz and Poincaré saw the group of rigid motions as constructed from sense experi-
ence. See, e.g., Gerhard Heinzmann: The Foundations of Geometry and the Concept of
Motion: Helmholtz and Poincaré. In: Science in Context. 14. September 2001, 457–470.
For them as well, while the group of rigid motions is a single set by virtue of being referred
to a single subjective experience, it is not necessarily single a priori.
25 Friedman (2000), 192.
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cannot account for the given unity of consciousness, i.e. Friedman’s “single initial
given point of view” – and we need a phenomenalist account precisely because we
need to represent that unity. But I am not sure that Parsons’s Continuability Prin-
ciple can account for the unity of space either. The continuability of perceptual
quantities when changing focus is accessible to us in perception, yes. Is that “con-
tinuability” a part of the representation of space or a concept we must assume to
represent space as we do? If the continuability of metaphysical space is a part of the
representation, then why is it a necessary unity a priori? One of Parsons’s descrip-
tions of infinity is that in each continuation of a line we perceive a boundless horizon
in which to extend that line. But the fact that with every representation we represent
a boundless horizon does not prove that those horizons constitute a unique meta-
physical space. Is it because we are aware that the ability to extend the line orig-
inates with us? If that is the case, then what feature of the subject as origin explains
the necessary unity of metaphysical space? The bare fact that the subject is physi-
cally singular, for instance, is not enough for Kant to argue that the subject occupies
a fixed, given point of view. If, on the other hand, continuability is a concept neces-
sary to explain our experience, then why can it not be subsumed under a constructed
concept? When changing focus, we pass through and run together distinct percep-
tions within the visual field, that is, we synthesize them. If the infinity of that field is
given to us in perception, then it is an infinity based on synthesis, and again, meta-
physical space is supposed to be the precondition for that synthesis, not its result.
While the debate between Friedman, Parsons, and Carson arguably has cleared
up Vaihinger’s conundrum by referring the givenness of metaphysical space to the
perception, whether empirical or geometrical, of an ability of the subject, the dif-
ficulties I’ve raised remain. I argue that there is a natural way to read Kant here on
metaphysical space, a way that will resolve most of the paradox of infinite given
magnitude, and many of the difficulties I’ve raised above. I think I can explain
how Kant thought metaphysical space “cannot be brought under any concept
capable of construction,” and how he thought such a space is a necessary condi-
tion of geometrical construction. Finally, I will show how this role for metaphys-
ical space is crucial Kant’s epistemological argument in the Critique. I argue that,
bracketing the difficulties with proving uniqueness, Kant’s argument is an ingeni-
ous way to reconcile empiricism with the doctrine of the transcendental ideality
of space and time. However, I do not think that the problem of the uniqueness of
metaphysical space is resolved so easily.
Kant argues, frequently, that magnitude [Größe] is generated in time according
to a rule. Interestingly, this seems to re-locate the difficulties I’ve raised with Fried-
man’s and Parsons’s interpretations to an apparent inconsistency within Kant’s
own stated views. Kant describes metaphysical space in the Critique as an infinite
given magnitude, he argues that all magnitude is constructed or generated accord-
ing to a rule, and then he argues in the correspondence with Kästner that meta-
physical space “cannot be brought under any concept capable of construction.”26
How can all of these statements be true at the same time? If metaphysical space is a
26 Cf. RezKästner, AA 20: 420.15–19.
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magnitude, then, according to Kant, it is constructed according to a rule. In that
case, it should be possible to subsume it under a constructed concept.
But the metaphysical space Kant calls infinite in the Aesthetic is a single space
that is the origin of all generations of magnitude. As a result, all generated mag-
nitudes must be thought as subsets of the series of possible determinations of the
original, single space that Kant describes in the Aesthetic. Kant describes this orig-
inal space as the representation that makes possible the distinction of the space
the subject occupies from the space an external object occupies.27 Any constructed
geometrical space is part of the set of determinations that originate from meta-
physical space, i.e., from the a priori representation of space that makes possible
all measurement of spatial magnitudes external to the subject.
Kant argues, further, that the set of constructed geometrical magnitudes is a
subset of the set of magnitudes generatable from the original representation of
space. As Kant continues in his correspondence with Kästner,
In jener [Metaphysik] ist er ursprünglich und nur ein (einiger) Raum, in dieser [Geometrie]
ist er abgeleitet, und da giebt es (viel) Räume, von denen aber der Geometer einstim¯ig mit
dem Metaphysiker, zu Folge der Grundvorstellung des Raumes gestehen muß, daß sie nur als
Theile des einzigen ursprünglichen Raums gedacht werden können. Nun kann man eine
Größe, in Vergleichung mit welcher jede anzugebende gleichartige nur einem Theile von ihr
gleich ist, nicht anders als unendlich benennen.28
Here Kant calls metaphysical space a Größe, a word he uses for geometrical
magnitudes and arithmetical quantities alike. Now if we are to distinguish meta-
physical space, which is the ground of the possibility of conceptual construction
according to a rule, from geometrical space, which is the result of such construc-
tion, then we must know what characteristic of metaphysical space means that
it is not subsumable under any constructable concept. To make the problem more
difficult, according to this passage we must regard the “original” space as the
same thing when represented metaphysically and geometrically. Here Kant simply
says, the representation of space, and it is clear from the context that he means the
representation of the “original space” by the metaphysician and by the geometer
are the same: they represent it as “infinite-given”.
But in what sense of “infinite”? Here is the crux. Kant describes an infinite
magnitude in this context as “eine Größe, in Vergleichung mit welcher jede anzu-
gebende gleichartige nur einem Theile von ihr gleich ist”. Kant’s argument here
may be drawn from Kant’s reflections on the so-called Galileo’s Paradox, which,
though it did not originate with Galileo, was presented in Two New Sciences,
a work with which Kant was familiar.29 According to Galileo, a set is infinite if it
can be put into one-to-one correspondence with at least one of its proper subsets.
As I’ve said above, Kant says that metaphysical space is infinite in this sense.
The basis of the infinity of metaphysical space is the fact that constructed geo-
metrical spaces are a proper subset of the determinations of the single metaphys-
27 Cf. KrV, A 23/B 38.20–26.
28 RezKästner, AA 20: 419.06–13.
29 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for Kant-Studien for pointing out the rel-
evance of Galileo’s Paradox here.
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ical space, and that geometrical spaces can be put into one-to-one correspondence
with metaphysical space. But to say so does not explain how or why this is true,
for Kant in particular. Why should it be the case that the set of geometrical mag-
nitudes is not coextensive with metaphysical space, for instance? What distin-
guishes the set of geometrical magnitudes from metaphysical space? Kant could
have meant that metaphysical space is a condition for the possibility of geometri-
cal magnitudes but is not different in kind: that the two sets are coextensive. How-
ever, as Carson and I emphasize, Kant is very sure in the correspondence that there
is a clear distinction.
Metaphysical space is the single, original space. As Kant argues in the Prin-
ciples, the original, pure intuition of space has the magnitude zero.30 Thus, if part
of Kant’s goal in the Aesthetic is to give the a priori conditions for calculating geo-
metrical magnitudes that are generated in time according to a rule, then what
Kant means by “infinite” here becomes clearer. There is a well-defined type of
comparison of what we would call vector quantities and what Kant and Newton
called fluxion quantities, according to which any two given similar such quan-
tities sum to zero: if they are oriented in opposite directions. If a magnitude, a line,
for instance, is drawn on paper, it has a determinate spatiotemporal orientation.
But if we draw that magnitude, the line, in thought a priori, its orientation is
indeterminate. In particular, regarded as a scalar quantity, any line drawn in
thought has two possible directions associated with it: two possible directions in
which it could be drawn. In other words, when we draw a line on paper, it must be
drawn from point A to point B or from point B to point A. But when we draw that
line in thought, we can imagine that it be drawn in either direction, by employing
the rule-governed figurative synthesis of productive imagination. The same holds
true for any geometrical figure. Any geometrical magnitude generated in a deter-
minate direction with respect to the subject’s position is “only a part” of the set of
similar magnitudes that can be generated by the subject from her position at the
origin of generations of magnitude.
Magnitudes generated in geometrical construction are oriented, that is, such
magnitudes have a specific direction, whereas figures drawn in thought do not.
Kant argues that we can know certain geometrical magnitudes only because they
are generated in time. He does so in the Reflexionen when explaining how we can
justify our knowledge of irrational quantities such as the square root of two, even
though we cannot represent them as finite fractions:
Wenn wir nicht Begriffe vom Raum hatten, so würde die Große √2 für uns keine Bedeutung
haben, weil man sich alsdann jede Zahl als Menge untheilbarer Einheiten vorstellen könnte.
Nun stellen wir uns eine Linie als durch fluxion, mithin in der Zeit erzeugt vor, in der wir
nichts Einfaches vorstellen, und können 1⁄10, 1⁄100, etc. etc. von der gegebenen Einheit
denken.31
30 See, e.g, KrV, A 188/B 233.14–234.31 and KrV, A 165/B 208.10–24. See especially KrV,
A 207–208/B 253.15–22, where Kant argues that alteration, considered a priori, is the
difference in magnitude between “the pure intuition = 0” and a determinate magnitude.
31 Refl, AA 14: 53.02–07.
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Note the final claim, that since we represent lines to ourselves through fluxion,
we can represent continuous quantities “von der gegebenen Einheit”. Kant says
in the previous sentence that every algebraic number (scalar) is a “Menge untheil-
barer Einheiten”.32 But the set of scalar quantities is only part of the set of spatial
magnitudes that can be synthesized “von der gegebenen Einheit”.33
If we consider a scalar line to be a set of single spaces or points, then the same
line, considered as a magnitude generated in time, always can be compared
a priori to the magnitude generated in the opposite direction but with the same
scalar quantity, and the two magnitudes will sum to zero. For instance, take
the line between point A and point B. We can represent that line as line AB, but it
is indifferent a priori whether it is AB or BA. The two vector or fluxion quantities,
AB and BA, sum to zero. In other words, if you begin at point A, draw a line to
point B, then draw the line back from point B to point A, you end up where you
began.
Here is where Kant sees his transcendental idealism as falling in line with his
empiricism. When the geometer draws a line, she is generating a scalar quantity,
but since that line is drawn in time, for Kant it is also a magnitude generated
in time, or what Newton called a “fluxion” quantity. In 1790, Kant writes in the
Reflexionen on the Critique:
32 As Kant remarks in the Reflexionen, “Die Gegenstande der Arithmetik und Algebra sind
ihrer Moglichkeit nach nicht unter Zeitbedingungen, aber doch die construction des Be-
grifs der Größe [so fern diese Gegenstande durch] in der Vorstellung derselben durch die
Synthesis der Einbildungskraft, nemlich die Zusammensetzung, ohne welche kein Gegen-
stand der Mathematik gegeben werden kan. Algebra ist eigentlich die [allgemeine Verbin-
dungskunst] Kunst, die Erzeugung [der Größen] einer unbekannten Größe durchs Zählen
unabhängig von jeder [gegebenen] wirklichen Zahl blos durch die gegebene Verhältnisse
derselben unter eine Regel zu bringen. Diese zu erzeugende Größe ist immer eine Regel des
Zählens, wornach die Größe bestimmt [gegeben gedacht] werden kan, zum Beyspiel die
Diagonallinie eines Qvadrats, aber nur in der Construction, nicht durch eine Zahl, son-
dern [ein] durch ein Zeichen des Zählens √2, welches den Begrif einer Größe bedeutet,
[zu deren Begrif vermittelst einer] [zu dem] der nur die Regel der Annäherung [zu einer]
des Zählens zu einer Zahl, welche die letztere ausdrükt, bedeutet. Daß eine solche Größe
möglich sey, würden wir ohne die Geometrie nicht wissen. Aber ohne Arithmetik (noch
vor der Algebra) würden wir von der Diagonallinie des Qvadrats auch keinen Begrif
seiner Größe haben können” (Refl, AA 14: 54.05–55.02).
33 A reader might object that I am building in too much of Newtonian science. As Carson
observes when objecting to Friedman’s logical reading, Kant’s goal in the Critique was not
to back up any particular scientific result, including Newton’s results in the Principia.
This distinguishes the Critique from the Metaphysical Foundations and the Prolegomena,
in which Kant gives concrete examples from science. In the Critique, Kant is concerned
to give a philosophical argument following the synthetic method, “was noch nichts als
gegeben zum Grunde legt außer die Vernunft selbst und also, ohne sich auf irgend ein
Factum zu stützen, die Erkenntniß aus ihren ursprünglichen Keimen zu entwickeln hat”
(Prol, AA 04: § 4, lines 32–35, cited in translation in Carson (1997), 495, emphasis added
by Carson). But fluxion quantities are generated in time. It is well known that Kant writes
in the Critique of time as being the form for the generation of quantity. Although Kant
is not appealing directly to Newton’s fluxion concept in its particulars, he certainly uses
the notion of fluxion quantity in the Critique, in the Reflexionen, and in his response to
Kästner.
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Im Raumes Vorstellung ist zwar nichts von Zeit gedacht, aber [so fern] in der Construction
[ders] des Begrifs von einem gewissen Raum, e.g. einer Linie [wie]. Alle Größe ist Erzeugung
in der Zeit durch wiederholte position eben desselben.34
If direction in time is not determinate a priori, then any geometrical line could
be oriented in either direction. A line drawn from point A to point B has the same
scalar quantity, the same measure, as the line drawn from B to A. In that sense, the
geometer sees the line as a single series of monadic spaces, whereas the metaphysi-
cian sees the line as two potential magnitudes generated and directed in time. This
is what Kant means when he says that the geometer and the metaphysician are
working with the same space. But the metaphysician’s knowledge that the line
could be oriented in either direction is necessarily a priori, because direction in
time is not observed directly in outer experience. However, direction is observed
immediately in inner sense, that is, in time. In Kant’s terms, direction, or orien-
tation, is not an empirical concept derived from the appearances. Necessary, or
determinate, direction or orientation can be constructed only in the form of time
determinations, according to the Principles as rules for synthesis.
For Kant, that any succession in time can be oriented in either direction follows
from the transcendental ideality of space and time, and in particular, from the fact
that space and time are “epistemic conditions” for representing objects, as Henry
Allison puts it.35 Kant’s metaphysical space is analogous, not to the broadest pos-
sible group of rigid motions derived from imaginative construction, but to the
set of invariant spatial magnitudes that can be generated in opposite directions a
priori.36
From a more contemporary standpoint, a rigorous proof of such a result would
require information about, for instance, symmetry relations. Friedman’s account
of the figurative synthesis of the imagination as making possible changes in our
perspective based on the group of rigid motions of rotation and translation is an
obvious source of our knowledge of such relations. Proving that two similar quan-
tities, two lines, for instance, have the same measure (scalar quantity) but distinct
directions will depend on our ability to reverse any rotatation or translation.
Thus, the interpretation of Kant that I defend limits Friedman’s account of the
figurative synthesis to symmetrical or reversible rigid motions a priori. For Kant,
the invariance of the measure of these magnitudes is guaranteed by the rules for
generating magnitudes in time, not by atemporal invariance relations such as the
axioms that determine Helmholtz’s groups of rigid motions.
34 Refl, AA 14: 54.01–04.
35 Henry Allison: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. New Haven 1983, Chapter 5, esp. 85f.
36 In the 19th century, neo-Kantians argued that this space could be given a more specific in-
carnation as the set of possible symmetric or reversible orientations in space, that is, the
group of invariant transformations. Ernst Cassirer, an influence on Friedman, was per-
haps the first to develop this interpretation. According to Cassirer, “Each special form of
geometry is coordinated with a definite group of transformations as its appropriate theory
of invariants, and these can be strictly defined and set over against each other.” Interest-
ingly, Cassirer appeals to James Clerk Maxwell’s Matter and Motion in the presentation
of his views. See Ernst Cassirer: Substance and Function, trans. William Swabey and
Marie Swabey. Chicago 1923, 249f.
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My account extends Kant’s explicit views about space and time, by interpreting
Kant’s figurative synthesis in terms of relations of symmetry, i.e., of invariance.
However, Kant was aware that symmetry or proportion was significant for his
theory. As I mentioned in a note above, Daniel Sutherland and Michael Friedman
have emphasized the influence of Eudoxus’s proportion theory on Kant’s mathe-
matics. Giora Hon has argued recently that Kant elaborates on the notion of sym-
metry in 1768 with “Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of
Directions in Space,” but that Kant stopped short of developing a mathematical
account and contented himself with a metaphysical account, according to which
symmetry is a type of balance or proportion.37
The balance of the evidence thus supports the claim that the best way to resolve
the paradox of infinite given magnitude is to argue that metaphysical space is the
set of equal and opposite a priori transformations of the subject’s perspective, that
is, of rotations and translations that generate magnitudes with the same scalar
measure but opposite orientations. Only these motions have the crucial feature of
summing to zero and thus constituting a single metaphysical space.
The figurative synthesis of the imagination is made possible by the fact that
such a space “exists”. Given any generation of a magnitude going in one direc-
tion, the subject always can generate a magnitude going in the opposite direction.
That is, if the subject can draw a line from A to B, that subject can draw a line
from B to A. Such is a necessary a priori condition for thinking of metaphysical
space in the first place. Further, such a space is infinite-given, because for meta-
physical space to be thinkable any given scalar quantity must be orientable in a
number of directions. For instance, with any given scalar line, two opposite mag-
nitudes generated in time are given that represent the possible directions it can be
generated in time. These magnitudes are associated with the same scalar quantity,
which can be given in experience. Thus, Kant can argue that metaphysical space is
infinite and given without transgressing the bounds of a possible experience.
The invariant position at the origin of all generation of magnitude is the sub-
ject’s a priori representation of space. Kant wants the original representation of
space to be the single representation that is at the ground of the generation of all
possible geometrical magnitudes. While I am not sure that his arguments on this
score are ultimately plausible, my goal was to show why Kant thought metaphys-
ical space cannot be subsumed under a concept. For Kant, since the original rep-
resentation of space a priori is single, there is no other representation that stands
in a determinate relation to it, and so it cannot be subsumed under a concept. As
Kant says in the citation above from the Kästner correspondence, the represen-
tation of space cannot be subsumed under a concept “because it is not the case
that there are many” such original representations of space: “weil es dessen nicht
viele giebt”.38
37 Giora Hon: Kant vs. Legendre on Symmetry: Mirror Images in Philosophy and Mathe-
matics. In: Centaurus 47, 2005, 283–297.
38 In context, the “es dessen nicht viele giebt” here does not mean “there are not many” in
the sense of “there are only a few.” Instead, Kant means that, while there are many geo-
metrical spaces (as he says in the passage just before this one), it is not the case that there
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The “boundless horizon” to which Parsons appeals is guaranteed by the fact
that the figurative synthesis is the basis of the rule-governed synthesis described in
the Schematism. Kant’s rules for the figurative synthesis govern the generation of
geometrical magnitudes with a determinate orientation in space and time with re-
spect to the subject. But the same rules are valid for the subject to generate a
further set of magnitudes in thought, with the same scalar quantity as the origin-
ally generated magnitudes, but with a distinct orientation with respect to the sub-
ject’s spatial position.39
Friedman, on the other hand, argues that, for Kant, the figurative synthesis of
the productive imagination a priori is a condition for the infinity and unbounded-
ness of space. Again, while I think the general view is correct, I do not agree with
Friedman’s account of why this is the case. Friedman focuses on the ability of the
subject to put herself in different perspectives with respect to the objects of ex-
perience:
the subject can imaginatively change the given point of location by a translation through
space and imaginatively change its given orientation by a rotation around this point. More-
over, by an appropriate combination of such translations and rotations the subject can
thereby imaginatively put itself in position to perceive any outer object located anywhere in
perceptual space. It is in this sense, I believe, that perceptual space is necessarily both singu-
lar or unitary and infinite or unbounded.40
According to this account of metaphysical space, the figurative synthesis would
end with the determination of a set of magnitudes. There would be no reason to
conclude that those magnitudes, as a collection, have any special properties,
including the special property of being a single space that Kant refers to above.
Further, as a set of determinate magnitudes, metaphysical space would be subsum-
able under the category of quantity.
I focus, instead, on the ability of the subject to generate magnitudes with the
same scalar quantity, but oriented oppositely with respect to the original repre-
sentation of space. Similar magnitudes oriented distinctly with respect to the sub-
ject’s original representation of space are generated by the figurative synthesis.
Once she has generated any one magnitude, it is given to the subject that she can
generate a magnitude of the same scalar quantity oriented oppositely with respect
to her original representation of space. Thus, the figurative synthesis a priori in
principle ought not end with the generation of a determinate quantity, including
a determinate path through space or the determination of an object of perception.
Instead, the result of the figurative synthesis is the construction of a set of spatial
relations, pairs of oppositely oriented magnitudes, that cannot be determined
further a priori. In particular, the figurative synthesis alone cannot determine a
positive quantity without the rules for necessary time determination, the Prin-
ciples.
are many metaphysical spaces: there is only one, the single, original representation of
space. Even time is not similar to space, because time is one-dimensional and space many-
dimensional, as Kant remarks.
39 Cf. KrV, A 140/B 179.25–37.
40 Friedman (2000), 192.
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It is crucial to Kant’s epistemology that Kant be able to prove that metaphysical
space (a) is a set of relations that are neutral in orientation and (b) is conceptually
prior to geometrical, and in particular to constructed, space. Geometrical spaces
are constructed using magnitudes generated in a particular direction in a finite
time, and so geometrical space in Kant’s sense does not have the necessary episte-
mological quality that all such quantities must sum to zero a priori over the space
as a whole. Only the set of symmetrical, invariant transformations a priori has
such a quality. All constructed geometrical spaces (metric spaces) can be regarded
as constructed within and as continuous with the set of all potentially construct-
ible fluxion quantities.
Given this fact, Kant can make the epistemological argument that any determi-
nate geometrical proof a priori that a given quantity must be oriented in one
direction or another is objectively meaningful, which is how synthetic judgments
a priori are possible in geometry.41 He can make the further argument that any
physical proof that gives a determinate direction for a given change proves that
the change is real, because it can determine a real quantity, that is, a magnitude
that does not sum to zero. In fact, Kant can demonstrate that a change is real if
and only if it can be represented as a determinately directed quantity, which,
I would argue, is what he does in the Analogies.
Kant can make the argument above only if the subject occupies a given, fixed
standpoint with respect to objects of experience. The subject’s standpoint, on my
interpretation of Kant, is the standpoint from which, considered a priori with re-
spect to their form, the set of spatial magnitudes of equal scalar quantity that can
be generated in time from that single position sum to zero. Only if that is the case
is metaphysical space unique or single. Thus, a central question raised by the de-
bate between epistemic and phenomenalist interpretations of Kant’s doctrine of
space and time is how Kant proposes to prove that the subject occupies a fixed
standpoint. Answering this question requires making decisions about how the
moving parts of Kant’s system fit together. If we say that Kant supports the claim
that the subject occupies a fixed position with regard to the objects by appealing
to the argument that space and time originate with the subject, as the forms of
subjective intuition, then some of the arguments in the Metaphysical Expositions
begin to appear to have gaps or even to be circular. Kant argues that a priori space
is single, infinite, and given in the Exposition of the concept of space. But if it
turns out that the singleness of space depends on a prior commitment to the sub-
ject as origin of ideal space, then the conclusions of transcendental idealism are
being brought in to buttress some of the primary arguments for transcendental
idealism.
An epistemic interpretation that does not appeal to pure intuitions of the sub-
ject could argue that the mathematical unity of apperception guarantees the fix-
ture of the subject’s standpoint, and indeed the above interpretation gives some
support to such a move. But if we appeal to the unity of apperception, then the
41 It is interesting to read the famous passage beginning at KrV, A 713/B 741.8–742.26 with
this interpretation in mind.
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Transcendental Analytic is being brought in to support the Aesthetic. It’s possible
to avoid doing so by making the mathematical unity of apperception regulative,
and not constitutive, of our intuitions. In that case, though, the unity of apper-
ception would no longer be given as a presupposition of subjective experience.
Michael Friedman’s own argument in the Dynamics of Reason for the plurality
and relativity of the constitutive mathematical frameworks of physical theories is
an example of such an approach.42
While the problem of the necessary unity and uniqueness of metaphysical space
remains, the great advantage of Kant’s distinction between metaphysical and geo-
metrical space is that it allows him to reconcile most aspects of transcendental
idealism with his empiricism. A geometrical line, for instance, is at one and the
same time a “set of indivisible unities”, that is, the “repeated position” of an ob-
servable point, and a continuous magnitude generatable in either direction, and
thus part of an infinite set, in Kant’s sense, of possible a priori transformations.
With this account, Kant can respond to skepticism about causality without ar-
guing that synthetic a priori judgments, and causal judgments in particular, orig-
inate in the mind. If the magnitude or quantity of any possible alteration, con-
sidered only as a change in space and time, is zero a priori, then it is at least
plausible prima facie that a judgment based on a unique determination of a posi-
tive magnitude in time and space will be objectively meaningful.43
42 Michael Friedman: Dynamics of Reason. Stanford 2001.
43 Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Emily Carson and Alison Laywine for extensive
discussions of my earlier work on these subjects.
